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Abstract 
A privacy-secure image sharing scheme of ubiquitous cameras on the Sensing Web is presented in this paper. It is aiming at 
distributing images taken by surveillance cameras to ordinary people, where ubiquitous sensors are opened to public use. 
However, privacy of recorded subjects should be protected by means of allowing a user to get images without revealing who and 
where the subjects were. Meanwhile, the one who owns surveillance cameras and offers an image should be able to identify the 
illegal user who pirates the image. The proposed system provides a solution against violation of user’s privacy and content piracy 
toward establishing a feasible and practical image trading system. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
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1. Introduction 
A ubiquitous sensor network that willing to be connected all kinds of sensors such as cameras and microphones 
has been developed in the context of what we call “Sensing Web” (Sensing Web, 2008). As a matter of fact that 
most sensors have been only used privately, it is demanded that any people can securely shares sensors like the web. 
One of the research topics regarding to Sweb is aiming at securely distributing images of the surveillance cameras to 
people where a ubiquitous sensors network is opened to public. However, two issues that are content piracy by a 
user and privacy violation of user information and recorded subjects need to be solved. Otherwise, a malicious user 
can easily make an illegal copy to distribute an image which also causes violating privacy of recorded subjects. On 
the other hand, if CP (a content provider) is malicious, users’ privacy would be violated since privacy information 
such as user name has sent to CP at registration process.  
One of the effective techniques against content piracy is a digital fingerprinting technique (Petitcolas, et al., 
2000a). In this scheme, a trustworthy CP distributes a protected image in which the user ID is embedded to the user 
using a digital watermarking technique. When a suspicious image has been found, CP extracts the embedded ID to 
identify a traitor. However, this scheme only works under an assumption that CP is perfectly trustworthy. Otherwise, 
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malicious CP can reveal an embedded image to prosecute an innocent user since the same embedded image is 
possessed by both the user and CP. In addition, users’ privacy has not been considered in this conventional scheme 
which, therefore, is inadequate for our model where a user deals with unreliable CPs. 
A semi-blind fingerprinting scheme (Okada et al., 2009a; Okada et al., 2009b) assumes to deal with as much 
unreliable CP as surveillance cameras. The proposed system which has been developed based upon the semi-blind 
technique is thought after a user wants to obtain an image taken by a surveillance camera. For example, assume the 
user may need an image to prove that she/he was there at the time for some reasons, the user obtains the image taken 
by a surveillance camera from CP who manages those surveillance cameras. The implemented image sharing system 
securely distributes images by providing a solution against privacy problems of recorded subjects and users. 
Recorded subjects are protected by blinding the subjects such as faces and license numbers. For example, face is 
clipped and license number is blinded to protect a privacy of recorded subjects in Fig.5 and 7. Users’ privacy is 
protected by managing it dispersedly between CP and a trusted third party (TTP). 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, we describe the reason why conventional blind fingerprinting is inadequate for our model which 
needs to be feasible and secure. In the naive content trading, a user makes a payment and receives content from CP. 
However, unprotected content can be easily pirated by a malicious user while privacy managed by CP can be easily 
violated by a malicious CP. 
2.1. Basic Model of Conventional Fingerprinting 
A digital fingerprinting (Petitcolas, et al., 2000a) based on a watermarking technique has been proposed as one of 
the approaches to protect content against piracy as illustrated in Fig. 1. In this scheme, CP embeds a unique user ID 
into an image before distributing. If a pirated image has been found, CP extracts the ID to identify an illegal user. 
This model is effective only if CP is perfectly trustworthy. Otherwise, inappropriate trading can be easily carried out 
by a malicious CP since both CP and a user possess the same embedded image. Even if a pirated image has been 
found, it is almost impossible to identify an illegal party either CP or a user. Another problem is that a malicious CP 
may expose user’s privacy information such as user name or purchasing record. 
2.2. Conventional Blind Fingerprinting using Public Key Encryption 
Various blind fingerprinting techniques (Pfitzmann, et al., 1996; Pfitzmann, et al., 1997; Iwamura, et al., 1997; 
Iwamura, et al., 2000) have been proposed as a countermeasure to the above defects of the conventional method. A 
basic idea is to apply encryption to protect user’s information as described below with an illustration in Fig. 2.  
1. A user prepares a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk), and encrypts a user ID by the pk. The user sends the 
encrypted ID and pk to CP. 
2. CP encrypts an original image using the given pk and then embeds the encrypted ID into the encrypted image 
without any decryption. The encrypted embedded image is sent back to the user. 
3. The user decrypts the embedded image by the sk to obtain an embedded image. 
CP has no clue as to who a user is because it is encrypted. In addition, a complete embedded image can be obtained 
only by the user, it is able to identify an illegal user if pirated copy was found. However, they are infeasible due to 
heavy computation cost of encryption and insufficient robustness.  
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Figure 1. Blind Fingerprinting 
 
For a case of (Okada, et al.,2008b), if 1024-bit El Gamal encryption had been applied, the size of ciphertext 
(extraction key) would be (1024 × 2 × z) bits where z is a number of pixels in an image. Note that two chipertexts 
are generated in El Gamal. For example, the chippertext becomes 50MB to embed 1 bit. Estimation embedding time 
is approximately (0.1 × z) second where a single bit encryption takes 0.1 second. Therefore, embedding would take 
approximately 175 minutes and extracting would take 1.5 minutes. In addition to processing cost, robustness is 
insufficient due to restriction occurred by use of encryption. 
 
Figure 2. Blind Fingerprinting 
3. Semi-blind Fingerprinting for Image Distribution System for the Sensing Web 
Semi-blind fingerprinting is an alternative method to conventional blind methods that protect privacy information 
at feasible processing cost and sufficient robustness by replacing encryption to image decomposition. The detail is 
described below with an illustration in Fig. 3. Assume, a user is verified, and an anonymous user ID is issued by 
TTP (a trusted third party) who manages a part of dispread privacy information. 
1. CP decomposes an image into two images (I1, I2) and then sends I1 to a user and I2 to TTP. Note that I1 
should have no product value so that the user doesn’t have incentive to redistribute it while I2 should be 
unrecognized in order to protect privacy of a user and recorded subjects in the image. 
2. TTP embeds the anonymous ID into the unrecognizable image I2 and then send it to the user. 
3. The user integrates decomposed images to obtain an embedded image. 
Following advantages are accrued by the trading scheme. 
z CP has no clue as to who a user is because of an anonymous ID, an illegal user is distinguishable either CP 
or the user since only the user has the complete embedded image. 
z TTP has no clue as to what kind of image has been traded because of unrecognizability of the image. 
z The user can obtain an image without revealing the user name and purchasing records. 
 
 
Figure 3. Concept of Semi-Blind Fingerprinting 
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3.1. Requirements 
The proposed scheme is composed of mainly two technical elements, image decomposition and embedding. 
Decomposition is required to decompose an image into two parts. One of which should be unrecognizable, though 
maintaining enough embedding room for watermark. In other words, an image should not be perceptually 
recognized, but have to maintain an image detail where watermark is embedded. Embedding is required to be 
scarcely affected by integration process. Nevertheless fragile watermark would be damaged when integrating into 
two decomposed images together. 
4. Implementation of a Web-Based System 
We implement a system based on a scenario in (Okada, et al., 2008a) which applies semi-blind fingerprinting as 
described in Fig. 4 and implementation environment is summarized in Table 1. The semi-blind fingerprinting 
mainly contains two phases, verification and trading phases. In prior to start a protocol, we define following. 
Assume, CP had registered timestamp of an original image at TTP, and a user had obtained a verification ticket at 
nearby cameras. 
 
 
Figure 4. Semi-Blind Fingerprinting Protocol 
 
4.1. Verification Phase 
In a verification phase, the user requests an image by using the verification ticket to CP. CP verifies the ticket in 
cooperation with TTP. If verified, the user could obtain an embedded image as follows.  
4.2. Image Trading Phase 
An image trading phase is described below with an illustration in Fig. 3. An implemented system includes three 
functions, image decomposition, embedding, and intergrading. Embedding is required to be sufficiently robust so 
that watermark can be detected after integrating two images together.  
First, a user selects one of the thumbnails of images where a user can obtain an image. As soon as selected, the 
original image I is decomposed by decomposition server that outputs two decomposed images (I1, I2) and then 
sends them to the user and TTP respectively. Sample of output images are shown in Fig. 5, and Fig. 7. Fig. 5 shows 
an effect of privacy protection which blinds a recorded face by a face detection technique using OpenCV. However, 
the problem is that face detection often fails to detect faces due to in adequate angle, poor resolution and so on. 
Therefore, pseudo block noise filtering is applied as an additional protection to blind a back ground image which is 
able to protect undetected feces. The filtered image in Fig. 7 is a case that a small face fails to be detected but block 
noise successfully blinds up the face. 
Second, CP embeds the anonymous ID into I2 to generate an embedded image I2’ and then sends it to the user.  
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Finally, the user integrates two images together by integration function to obtain an embedded image as I’=I1+I2’ 
where + indicates integration process. 
The proposed solution provides following achievements; CP doesn’t know the user because of an anonymous ID, 
and TTP has no clue as to what the recorded subjects are since the image is blinded to be unrecognized. In addition 
to privacy protection, piracy protection is made possible by embedding watermark.  
Table 1. Implementation Environment
Detail Specification 
CPU Core 2 Duo T7100@1.80GHz 
Memory 2.5GB RAM 
OS Windows XP SP3 
Watermark Tool Adobe Photoshop CS2 Digimarc Plug in 
Decomposition Matlab2008a 
Face Detection OpenCV 
Robustness Stirmark Benchmark 4 
4.3. Pirate Identification 
When a pirated image has been found by CP, an illegal user is identified by extracting ID in cooperation with the 
TTP. If message has been extracted, we define that the user is most likely a traitor while if no message has been 
detected, we define CP may be a traitor. 
4.4. Image Decomposition 
Decomposition methods need to satisfy two requirements that are inconsistent with each other. The feature of an 
image where watermark is embedded needs to be sufficiently remained in I2. Meanwhile, I2 must be unrecognized. 
We have proposed and implemented following decomposition methods to protect privacy of recorded subjects. 
1. Face Clipping divides I into a face part and a background part as (1A,1B)=FC(I). 1A, a face part, considered 
as privacy information is sent to a user and 1B is sent to CP.  
2. Block Noise Decomposition is an invisible masking filer that decomposes an image into two pseudo block 
noise images as (1Ba,1Bb)=BND(1B) which are hardly recognized by human eyes. They are required to 
maintain image information for the sake of watermark embedding. Besides, watermark is not able to embed 
in a complete noise image. Block noise images are generated by every bn×bn small blocks (bn = 4 in this 
case). Note that the divided images are simply restored by summing up all pixels in the image as 1B 
=1Ba+1Bb where + indicates sum up calculation of brightness. 
3. I1 is generated as I1=1A+1Ba and I2 = 1Bb. 
   
Figure 5. I2 Lenna Figure 6. I Washington Figure 7. I2 Washington 
5. Evaluation 
We have examined two evaluations, watermark strength of an integrated image and the one against manipulation 
attacks. We have used following parameters. 24-bit message for watermark embedded by Digimarc with a 512 × 
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512, 256-gray levels of image. For robustness evaluation, we have used Stirmark Benchmark (Petitcolas, 2000b) as 
a benchmark tool that generates various kinds of manipulated attacked images. Watermark strength is evaluated by 
extracting those images. In this implementation, 103 kinds of attacks that consists of 15 types of manipulations and 
several levels in each attacks is applied such as Affine transform, Conversion filter, Cropping, JPEG compression, 
Latest small random Distortion, Median cut, Adding noise, Rescale, Remove lines, Rotation, Small random 
Distortions, Rotation, Rotation cropping, Rotation scale, and Self similarities. For instance of JPEG compression, 12 
compression levels from 100% to 15% has been applied. In this implementation with an image in Fig. 5, watermark 
is successfully detected from 74 images out of 103 attacked images while watermark without any decomposition is 
detected from 88 attacked images. This result indicates this decomposition is practical and robust enough. 
6. Conclusion 
The demand for releasing surveillance cameras, used in a private environment, to public for efficient use is 
increasing. Nonetheless, there are problems need to be solved. Our proposed protocol provides the solutions of 
identifying a traitor and protecting privacy of a user and recorded subjects. A user is able to deal with CP without 
revealing user information because of interposal of a trusted third party which proceed for verification and 
embedding. Furthermore, a user is able to obtain an embedded image without revealing the privacy information that 
can be inferred from an image to TTP by blinding an image. It is also able to infallibly identify an illegal user since 
only a user possesses a complete embedded image. Since a ubiquitous network is required to be feasible and 
practical, we have composed a protocol without any expensive technique such as encryption. Instead, we have used 
an existing watermark algorithm to prove feasibility of the proposed protocol as well as evaluated results.  
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